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COMMENT 
INTERNET COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
LIABILITY: IS AN ONLINE ACCESS 
PROVIDER MORE LIKE A LANDLORD OR A 
DANCE HALL OPERATOR? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to technological change. 1 Digital technolou is the 
1. "[T]he invention of the . . . printing press . . . gave rise to the original 
need for copyright protection." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984). Congress first enacted copyright legislation in 1790, lim-
iting protection to maps, charts, and books. Andrea Sloan Pink, Copyright Infringe-
ment Post Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 UCLA L: 
REv. 587, 597 (1995) (referring to Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 
124 (repealed 1831». Since that time, the inventions of radio, television, movies, 
and videocassette recorders ("vCRs") have had a dramatic impact on intellectual 
property rights. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFoRMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFoRMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (1995) 
(hereinafter "NIl White Paper"). Responding to significant technological changes, 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, noting that "[d]uring the past half 
century a wide range of new techniques for capturing and communicating printed 
matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, and the increasing 
use of information storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites, and la-
ser technology promise even greater changes in the near future." Id. at 8 (quoting 
H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976». 
2. Digital technology is a method that converts information into an electrical 
impulse in the form of a binary number, represented by either a zero or one. Rob-
ert D. Sprague, Multimedia: The Convergence of New Technologies and Traditional 
Copyright Issues, 71 DENY. U.L. REv. 635, 637 n.9 (1994). For example, music is 
initially composed of analog sound waves which can be converted into digital code 
by breaking the waves into small bits of information expressed as a zero or a one. 
Id. Before information can be received, stored, and manipulated by a computer, it 
must be converted into digital code. Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of Digitized 
Music on the Internet: A Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUT-
555 
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most recent innovation affecting copyright law and intellectual 
property.3 Current technology can convert most forms of intel-
lectual property into digital form! Computer networks, such 
as the Internet,5 electronically transfer digital information 
around the world.6 The growing use of the Internet, coupled 
with the availability of intellectual property in digital form, 
create a technological backdrop for massive copyright infringe-
ment.7 
ER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97, 103 (1996) (noting quality of music distributed online 
identical to original due to digital technology). Digitization allows all infonnation, 
whether text, images or sounds, to be recorded and transmitted in a universal 
computer language. Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors' Rights In A Digital Age, 
27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) (discussing the digital revolution). 
3. Pink, supra note 1, at 588. 
4. Id. at 590. For example, digitized music is available on compact discs. 
Computer programs, magazines, books, and video games can all be digitized. Pho-
tographs can be stored on computer disks. In addition, companies are developing 
fllmless electronic cameras to record photographs on a video floppy disk. With the 
advent of digital scanners, entire books and magazines can be converted into digi-
tal fonn with little effort. Id. at 590-96. 
5. The Internet is a giant network which connects innumerable smaller 
groups of linked computer networks worldwide. American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996). It is thus a network of networks. 
An estimated 9,400,000 host computers are linked to the Internet, approximately 
60 percent of which are located within the United States. This count does not in-
clude the personal computers that people use to access the Internet. Some of the 
computer networks that make up the Internet are owned by governmental agen-
cies and public institutions, some are owned by non-profit organizations, and some 
are privately owned. No single entity administers the Internet. A common feature 
among all Internet-linked computer networks is an agreement to use the same da-
ta transfer protocols to insure technical compatibility in the transmission of com-
munications between computers. Communication over this redundant system of 
computer links could travel over any number of routes to its destination. Thus, a 
message sent from a computer in Washington, D.C. to a computer in Palo Alto, 
California, might first be sent to a computer in Philadelphia. If one computer net-
work malfunctioned or was otherwise unavailable, the message would automatically 
be re-routed across a different computer network, without any human intervention. 
The Internet has evolved into a public communications forum, allowing anyone 
with access to the Internet to exchange infonnation. Id. at 830-32. Contrary to 
myth, the Internet did not begin as a Cold War effort by the U.S. military to es-
tablish defense communications in case of nuclear attack. KATIE HAFNER & MAT-
THEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 10 (1996). Although funded by the 
Defense Department, the computer network project, called ARPANET, linked re-
searchers to powerful supercomputers located at key universities. Id. Later, it be-
came a network allowing universities, corporations and people around the world to 
exchange infonnation. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831-32. It is estimated that 40 mil-
lion people around the world access the Internet. The number of users is expected 
to grow to 200 million Internet users by 1999. Id. 
6. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 4. 
7. Pink, supra note 1, at 592. The NIl White Paper states "the establishment 
of high-speed, high-capacity electronic infonnation systems [computer networks) 
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. Advances in digital technology have a significant impact 
on intellectual property rights.8 Authors are increasingly able 
to distribute their works directly to consumers, reducing the 
time between creation and distribution.9 The Internet also 
opens additional markets for authors.lO Creators have access 
to the entire world of online users.ll Theoretically, every com-
puter user can become his or her own publisher, and every 
computer terminal can become a library, bookstore, or audio 
and video jukebox. 12 
Distribution on the Internet, however, exposes authors to 
a greater risk of uncontrolled copying, adaptation and piracy 
than traditional media. 13 Once a work is digitized, it can be 
makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect cop-
ies of digitized works to scores of other individuals." NIl White Paper, supra note 
1, at 7. 
8. Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway'; Au-
thors, E%ploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1466-67 
(1995). 
9. Nil White Paper, supra note 1, at 6. 
10. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467-68. The Internet provides an eJlsy and in-
expensive way for an author to reach a large audience. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 
843. Using the World Wide Web, a popular graphical platform linking key words 
or concepts to additional sites for more information, an author can establish a site 
or "home page" to advertise and distribute her work. Id. at 836-42. Thus, start-up 
costs of production and advertising are significantly lower using the Internet than 
traditional media, greatly reducing cost barriers to market entry. Id. at 843. All 
that is required to publish on the Web is a personal computer, appropriate soft-
ware, and a modem to connect over a telephone line directly to the Internet or in-
directly by subscribing to an Internet access provider. Id. at 837. Besides cost sav-
ings for authors, the Internet establishes a new venue for distribution. Patrick M. 
Reilly, N2K Hires Phil Ramone to Start Up a Music Label Linked to the Internet, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1996, at B5. For example, the record label N2K recently re-
leased a single from David Bowie's new album only available via its Internet site, 
hoping to attract a new market segment. Id. In addition, various newspapers and 
magazines have introduced electronic editions on the Internet that supplement or 
exclusively present material. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 105. David Scott 
Lewis, publisher of E-Magazine, distributed via the Internet, commented that "I 
haven't spent a nickel and I'm putting out an international magazine and round-
ing up tens of thousands of subscribers." Pink, supra note 1, at 593 n.30 (quoting 
Dean Takahashi, Paper-Less Publisher, LA TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Mar. 2, 
1994, at D1.) 
11. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467. The nature of Internet technology blurs 
geographic boundaries, creating a worldwide electronic marketplace for the creator 
of an artistic work. Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 567 
(1996). 
12. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467. 
13. Nil White Paper, supra note 1, at 6. 
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stored, modified, and reproduced easily and quickly, with virtu-
ally no loss of quality.14 A single unauthorized uploading15 of 
a copyrighted work onto an electronic bulletin board16 may di-
minish or destroy the market for an author's work. 17 Such 
exposure may inhibit an author's incentive to create new 
works. IS 
14. Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law 
Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 174 
(1995). 
15. "Uploading/downloading" are terms in the Internet lexicon. Uploading refers 
to the transfer of information from a user's personal computer to a computer net-
work, usually via a bulletin board, while downloading refers to the transfer of in-
formation from a bulletin board or the Internet to one's personal computer. Play-
boy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 nn. 1, 3 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
16. An electronic bulletin board system ("BBS") is an online service that allows 
subscribers (free or for a fee) to exchange electronic mail messages ("e-mail"), text, 
computer programs, photographs, music and other forms of information. Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: 
The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 347 n.5 (1995). A user simply uploads material from her 
computer onto the bulletin board. All subscribers have access to all bulletin board 
messages, and any subscriber may download the material to her own computer. 
Bulletin boards may be subject specific. Id. The electronic bulletin board is one of 
the most popular services available through the Internet and other computer net-
works. Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators 
for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. 
REv. 391, 394 (1995). An estimated 50,000 bulletin board systems now operate in 
the United States. Id. at 395. More than 70,000 bulletin board systems are esti-
mated in operation worldwide. Telephone Interview with Stanton McCandlish, Pro-
gram Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (March 12, 1997). The number 
of subscribers to bulletin boards vary. Tickle, supra, at 395. The largest bulletin 
board systems, operated by commercial online services such as America Online, 
CompuServe, Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, together have over twelve million 
subscribers. George Tibbits, Microsoft Offers a Snazzier Online Service, S.F. 
CHRON., Oct. 11, 1996, at E3~ Small bulletin board systems, often operating out of 
an organizer's home, may have 20 to 200 subscribers. Tickle, supra, at 395. 
17. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6. Since digital works may be instan-
taneously transmitted to hundreds of thousands of bulletin board subscribers, a us-
er could download or print unlimited copies of a copyrighted work without paying 
a royalty to the copyright owner. Id. In 1994, electronic piracy on the Internet and 
other computer networks accounted for nearly one billion dollars. Adam S. 
Bauman, The Pirates of the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A1. In addition, 
digital works are easily modified and manipulated, raising concerns about deriva-
tive works. Pink, supra note 1, at 595. A derivative work is "based upon one or 
more preexisting works . . . in which a work may be recast, transformed or 
adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). Besides economic damage, digitization implicates 
an author's moral rights in the integrity of her work, raising concerns about alter-
ation or mutilation of a work in digital form. See, THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, SOFT-
WARE PuBLISHER'S AsSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE TO MULTIMEDIA 57-60 (1994). 
18. Leaffer, supra no'te 2, at 5. 
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In addition to technological advances, the culture of the 
Internet adds to copyright protection concerns.19 The prevail-
ing attitude of Internet users is that anything available over 
the Internet should be free. 20 Thus, a basic tension exists be-
tween the goal of a free flow of information on the Internet and 
the protection of intellectual property rights.21 Finding solu-
tions to protect intellectual property rights while maintaining 
the unrestricted flow of ideas via the Internet is essential to 
realizing the full potential of the Internet.22 
The digital environment of cyberspace23 poses serious 
challenges to existing copyright law.24 The development of 
legal standards of liability for copyright infringement lags 
behind advances in digital technology and growth of the 
Internet.25 The liability of an Internet access provider (herein-
after "access provider',)26 for the infringing activities of one of 
19. Segal, supra note 2, at 98-100 (discussing entitlement philosophy of 
Internet users). 
20.Id. 
21. See NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6; McCoy & Boddie, supra note 14, 
at 169-72 (discussing author's fear of electronic theft and potential chilling effect 
on development of Internet); Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1467 (discussing whether 
author will be in driver's seat on information highway or "deer in the headlights" 
of vast traffic author cannot control). 
22. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 6. 
23. The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction novelist William Gib-
son to describe the fantasy electronic world in which his characters interacted. 
Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1639 n.3 (1995). The 
term has been adopted by users of computer networks as a metaphor to represent 
an electronic representation of the real world, broadly encompassing the entire 
experience of communicating through computer networks. Id. 
24. Tickle, supra note 16, at 392. 
25. Id. at 392 n.5. 
26. An access provider is distinguished from a commercial online service in 
this Comment. An access provider is a company that leases the use of its comput-
er facilities to connect Ii. subscriber to a regional network linked to the Internet. 
Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the Internet, 437 PLIIPat 417, 422 (1996). 
Netcom On-line Communication Services is the country's largest access provider. 
David Einstein, AT & T Move Hurts Internet Providers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 
1996, at B3. Others are PANIX, and Infinet. Frank, supra, at 422. In contrast, a 
commercial online service not only provides access to the Internet, but also offers 
proprietary content-based services through its own private computer network. Id. 
The largest commercial online services are America On-line, CompuServe, Microsoft 
Network, and Prodigy. Tibbits, supra note 16, at E3. These commercial online ser-
vices create content-based services specifically for their subscribers. Alex Alben, 
What is an On-line Service? (In the Eyes of the Law), 13 No. 6 COMPUTER LAw 1, 
3 (1996). Content services may include news stories, original articles, shopping in-
5
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its subscribers is far from clear.27 The few cases involving the 
Internet have been decided with inconsistent results.28 Thus, 
case law has left online access providers uncertain about when 
and under what circumstances they would be liable for the 
infringing activities of their users.29 
Although the case did not involve the Internet, the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction30 may have a 
significant impact on an access provider's liability.31 In this 
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the operator of a swap meet may be held contributorily 
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement, based on a 
finding that it had rented booths to vendors who sold counter-
feit tape recordings.32 Considering the Ninth Circuit holding 
in Fonovisa, online access providers may face greater scrutiny 
for a subscriber's infringing activities.33 
This Comment examines the issue of whether an access 
provider may be found liable for copyright infringement by a 
bulletin board subscriber.34 It provides a background of copy-
right law and policy,35 discusses traditional legal theories of 
formation, or sports scores and weather information automatically updated from a 
wire service. Id. Other services may include operating bulletin boards, hosting chat 
groups, or setting up interactive discussion forums. Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of 
System Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99 (1996). 
27. Tickle, supra note 16, at 398. 
28. Kevin M. Cox, Online Service Providers and Copyright Law: The Need for 
Change, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS.&POL'y. 197, 199 (1995). See Cubby v. CompuServe, 
776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) (holding online service provider not lia-
ble for defamatory statement of subscriber without actual or constructive knowl-
edge); Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559 (holding bulletin board system operator liable 
for direct infringement regardless of lack of knowledge of infringing activities of 
subscriber); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(granting copyright owner's motion for preliminary injunction based on strong like-
lihood of success in showing contributory infringement by bulletin board system 
operator); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (holding provisions in Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 which impose liability on Internet access providers for transmis-
sion of obscene and indecent communications unconstitutional). 
29. Cox, supra note 28, at 202. 
30. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
31. David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Contributory Liability for Swap 
Meets, Internet Providers, 215 N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1996, at 3, 3. 
32. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64. 
33. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33. 
34. See infra part III. 
35. See infra notes 46-85 and accompanying text. 
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copyright infringement liability,36 and analyzes a recent case 
that, for the first time, directly addressed the issue of an 
Internet access provider's liability, Religious Technology Center 
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services.37 This Comment 
discusses the application of the legal principles in Fonovisa v. 
Cherry Auction to the potential liability of an online access 
provider.3s This Comment concludes with a critique proposing 
that revision of the copyright law is necessary to preserve 
intellectual property rights without chilling the growth of the 
Internet.39 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the complexity of liability issues in the 
online environment, a familiarity with the statutory rights 
granted to authors, limitations such as the "fair use" doctrine, 
rules regarding infringement and the explication of those rules 
through case law is important.40 This section summarizes 
copyright law and its underlying purpose to promote the prog-
ress of science and the useful arts, motivating the first Copy-
right Act signed into law in 1790 by George Washington41 to 
the current revisions.42 Next, this section analyzes traditional 
theories of infringement liability and traces the applicable case 
law.43 Finally, this section analyzes the first case to directly 
address the liability of an Internet access provider, Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom.44 Although the case settled be-
fore reaching judicial determination, a pre-trial ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment raises the possibility that an 
access provider may be held contributorily liable for copyright 
36. See infra notes 86-170 and accompanying text. 
37. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See infra notes 171-234 and accompanying 
text. 
38. This will be done by applying the Fonovisa analysis to the facts presented 
in Netcom. 
39. See infra notes 354-64 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 54-170 and accompanying text. 
41. NIl White Paper, supra note I, at 11 n.31. 
42. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1996). 
43. See infra notes 86-170 and accompanying text. 
44. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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infringement by computer users.45 
A. COPYRIGHT LAw AND POLICY 
Intellectual property protection in the United States has 
both a constitutional and statutory basis.46 Under the Consti-
tution, Congress has the power to promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries.47 The intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion was to provide authors an economic incentive to create 
and make their works available to the public.48 Thus, the pri-
mary purpose of copyright law is to motivate the creation of 
works of literature, music, art and entertainment for the bene-
fit of society.49 As the text of the Constitution makes clear, it 
is Congress that has the task of defining the scope of copyright 
protection to balance the competing interests of authors and 
society. 50 Congress enacted the first copyright law on May 31, 
1790.51 Repeatedly, as innovations in technology altered the 
balance, Congress fashioned new rules. 52 Digital communica-
45. [d. at 1383. 
46. Ariel B. Taitz, Removing Road Blocks Along the Information Superhighway: 
Facilitating the Dissemination of New Technology by Changing the Law of Contrib-
utory Copyright Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 133, 137 (1995). 
47. u. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
48. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985). 
49. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 11-13. The Supreme Court has often ar-
ticulated the purpose of copyright, stating that the primary objective of copyright 
is not to reward the labor of authors. Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). Rather, it is to "promote the progress of science 
and useful arts." Id. By granting a marketable right to the author, copyright sup-
plies the economic incentive to produce and distribute creative works. Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 546. The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the indi-
vidual author so that the public will benefit. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984). In Mazer V. Stein, the Supreme Court stat-
ed that the "economic philosophy behind the [constitutional] clause . . . is the con-
viction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare .... " Mazer V. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
50. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
51. NIl White Paper, supra note 1 at 11 n.31. 
52. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31. For example, development of the copy machine 
prompted a statutory exemption for library copying in the Copyright Act of 1976; 
development of computer software prompted expansion of copyright protection; de-
velopment of cable and microwave technologies prompted enactment of re-transmis-
sion of television program provisions; development of the audio tape recorder 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/12
1997] INTERNET COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 563 
tions and the Internet now present new challenges to preserve 
the balance. 53 
1. Exclusive rights 
To accomplish the goal of stimulating creativity, the 1976 
Copyright ActM grants the owner of a copyright certain exclu-
sive rights for a limited time,55 often referred to as a "bundle 
of rights."56'Under the terms of the Act, a copyright owner has 
exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work,57 prepare 
derivative works,58 distribute copies,59 and in certain instanc-
prompted the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. [d. at 430 n.ll. 
53. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 8. 
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1996). For more than two centuries, U.S. copyright 
law has been periodically amended to adapt to technology changes; the 1976 Copy-
right Act is the most recent major revision. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 8. 
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1996). Generally, a copyrighted work is protected 
for the length of the author's life plus another 50 years. [d. The terms of protec-
tion for works created before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 revi-
sions to the Copyright Act, are set forth in sections 303 and 304 of the Act. See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (1996). When the term of protection for a copyrighted work 
expires, the work falls into the "public domain," the legal status for a work that 
does not require permission to use. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 38. 
56. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990). 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1996). This right is defined as the right to reproduce 
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. [d. Because of the nature of com-
puter technology, this right is implicated in most Internet transmissions. NIl 
White Paper, supra note 1, at 41. For example, when a computer user downloads 
a file from a bulletin board, a copy is reproduced in the user's computer memory. 
Under U.S. copyright law, a copy is made and subject to infringement liability 
whenever a work is placed into a computer, irrespective of whether the work is 
stored on a disk, hard drive or in the random access memory (RAM) of the user's 
computer; when a photograph is scanned into a digital file; when a sound record-
ing is digitized; or when a digitized file is transferred from one computer to an-
other via a computer network. [d. at 41-42. 
58. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1996). A "derivative work is a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, . . . or 
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1996). This right is also implicated in the transmission of messages 
on the Internet. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 43. A computer user who edits, 
translates, or otherwise modifies a downloaded file creates a derivative work. [d. 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1996). The copyright owner has the exclusive right to 
sell, give away, rent or lend copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public. [d .. According to a Florida district court, the unauthorized downloading of 
copyrighted photographs by bulletin board subscribers implicated the copyright 
owner's right to distribute copies. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Notwithstanding such right, the owner of a legal copy 
or phonorecord has the right to sell or otherwise dispose of her copy. 17 U.S.C. 
9
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es, publicly perform60 or display61 the work.62 Each of these 
§109(a) (1996). Such right is referred to as the "first sale" doctrine. NIl White Pa-
per, supra note 1, at 43. This means that the copyright owner generally has only 
the right to authorize or prohibit the initial distribution of a copy of a copyrighted 
work. [d. It is unclear, however, if the legal owner of a copyrighted work, such as 
a CD, may upload it onto a bulletin board for others to download. Segal, supra 
note 2, at 115-16. Part of the confusion arises from the nature of a digital trans-
action. Unlike a conventional transaction in which the original owner no longer 
possesses her copy, in a digital transaction, the original owner retains her copy. 
This aspect of dispossession is extremely important. [d. Under the "first-sale doc-
trine," the original owner may "dispose of the possession of that copy" without in-
fringing the author's right of distribution. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1996). Therefore, if 
one characterizes the uploading of a lawful copy of a work onto a bulletin board 
for others to download as a distribution rather than a reproduction, the computer 
user may be entitled under the first-sale doctrine to re-distribute the work without 
infringing the copyright owner's right of distribution. Segal, supra, at 116. Presi-
dent Clinton's task force on the National Information Infrastructure takes the posi-
tion that no loophole exists because a digital transmission does not fit the terms 
of the first-sale limitation. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 61. The first sale 
doctrine limits only the copyright owner's distribution right; it in no way affects 
the reproduction right. ld. at 59. Under current technology, a computer user who 
transmits a copy of a copyrighted work via the Internet is actually reproducing 
the work because she retains her original copy. Thus, the transmission would 
constitute infringement of the copyright owner's reproduction right, unless exempt 
under another provision of the Copyright Act. ld. 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1996). The public performance right is limited to liter-
ary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works. ld. Only "public" performances are covered by copyright 
law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). The Copyright Act defines a "public" place as one 
that is open to the public or any place where a substantial number of persons 
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. ld. 
Most commentators believe that the defmition of "public" is sufficiently broad to 
apply to the Internet where multiple individual viewers may watch a performance 
in a variety of locations at different times. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 46. 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1996). The right to display is available to copyright 
owners of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, with the exception of sound recordings. ld. In 
the context of the Internet, when a computer user posts a copyrighted work in 
any medium and another user visually browses through it, the work has been dis-
played. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 46. 
62. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)-(5) (1996). It is important to note that the rights of 
copyright owners of sound recordings, typically record companies, are listed sepa-
rately in section 114(a). ld. § 114. Unlike copyright owners of the underlying mu-
sical composition, typically songwriters and music publishers, record companies do 
not have the right to perform nor display the work publicly. ld. Thus, how a work 
is categorized affects the bundle of rights accorded to it, raising issues of classifi-
cation for "multimedia" works transmitted on the Internet. NIl White paper, supra 
note 1, at 26-28. "Multimedia" works combine elements of text, sound, and images 
in a single medium of expression. ld. The recent passage of the Digital Perfor-
mance Right in Sound Recordings Act in November, 1996, however, creates an ex-
clusive performance right in sound recordings that are digitally transmitted and 
may otTer new protection in the online environment. Richard Raysman & Peter 
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exclusive rights is implicated by communication on the 
Internet.63 
2. Infringement 
Under the Copyright Act, any invasion of these exclusive 
rights constitutes infringement. 54 Since scienter is not re-
quired, even innocent or accidental infringement is action-
able.65 The Copyright Act further prescribes an array of reme-
dies to compensate owners for such copyright infringement.66 
To prevail on a claim of direct copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must prove 1) ownership of the copyrighted work and 
2) "copying" by the defendant.67 Implicit in the first require-
ment is eligibility for copyright protection.6s Copyright protec-
tion extends only to works of authorship satisfying three crite-
Brown, Intellectual Copyright Developments, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1996, at 3, 3. 
63. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 40-47. 
64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (1996). Section 501(a) provides that anyone who 
engages in or authorizes violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner is an infringer of the copyright. Id. at §501(a). Of course, penIDssion of the 
copyright owner exempts one from liability. NIl White Paper, supra note 1 at 65. 
In addition, sections 107 through 118 of Title 17 describe a variety of uses of 
copyrighted material that are not infringements. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447. Statutory 
limitations on a copyright owner's exclusive rights include "fair use" enumerated in 
section 107, certain library exemptions enumerated in section 108, the "first sale 
doctrine" enumerated in section 109, performance or display of copyrighted works 
in teaching activities by a nonprofit institution as enumerated in section 110, and 
compulsory licensing provisions that allow cable systems and satellite operators to 
retransmit copyrighted programming without infringement liability by paying a 
statutory licensing fee. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1996). 
65. Segal, supra note 2, at 125. 
66. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05 (1996). Remedies for infringement include an in-
junction to prevent further violation of the copyright holder's rights, impoundment 
and destruction of all infringing works, the option of electing statutory damages or 
actual damages and profits, and costs and attorneys' fees. Id.; Sony, 464 U.S. at 
433-34. Criminal sanctions may also be levied if the infringement was willful and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private fmancial gain. See 17 U.S.C. § 
506(a) (1996). 
67. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556. 
68. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 14. The Copyright Act enumerates eight 
broad categories of protectible subject matter: 1) literary works (encompassing 
computer programs); 2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 3) 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; 5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; 6) motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings; and 8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (1996). 
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ria: originality, creativity, and fIxation in a tangible medium of 
expression.69 Even if they meet these criteria, certain works 
and subject matter are expressly excluded from protection 
under the Copyright Act.70 Ideas and facts are not copyright-
able; this protection extends only to the expression of ideas and 
facts.71 In addition, titles, names, short phrases and slo-
gans,72 as well as works of the U.S. Government, are general-
ly not copyrightable. 73 
With regard to the second requirement in an infringement 
action, courts generally use the term "copying" as shorthand 
for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner, not merely the reproduction right.74 In the context of 
the Internet, recent cases have held that the process of up-
loading or downloading digital messages constitutes copying. 75 
Thus, individuals who post or receive unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted work on the Internet may be liable for copyright 
infringement.76 
69. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 14. To be original, a work must be in-
dependently created and not copied. In contrast to patent law, there is no require-
ment that a work be novel, unique or ingenious. As to creativity, the threshold is 
very low. [d. "The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark .... " Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. Congress left room for 
technological advances in the area of fIxation by noting that the method of fIxation 
may be "now known or later developed." See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996). A work is 
fIxed "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). As an ex-
ample, the telecast of a live baseball game that is videotaped at the same time it 
is broadcast is fIxed in a tangible form, thus copyrightable. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987). 
70. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 20. 
71. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996). 
72. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 20. 
73. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1996). 
74. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 66. 
75. Advanced Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAl Systems Corp., 845 F. 
Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that "copying" for the purposes of copy-
right law occurs when a computer program is placed into a computer's random ac-
cess memory); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 
1335 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996); see 2 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §8.08(A)(1) at 8-112 (1994). 
76. Taitz, supra note 46, at 152. 
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3. Fair Use Defense 
One of the statutory limitations on a copyright owner's 
exclusive rights is the doctrine of fair use.77 Fair use is an 
affirmative defense to an action for copyright infringement.78 
The judicially-created doctrine, now codified in the Copyright 
Act, excuses otherwise infringing conduct if the social benefit 
outweighs the loss to the copyright owner.79 This defense re-
flects the basic goal of copyright law .in balancing an author's 
claim to her work against the public's interest in access to the 
work.80 
Statutory language suggests the type of activities which 
might be considered fair use: criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching or research.81 A common example of fair use is 
the incorporation of a quotation from a book or play by a re-
viewer.82 In applying the doctrine of fair use, the courts con-
sider four factors enumerated in the Act.83 These factors in-
clude the purpose of the use, the nature of the material, the 
amount used, and, perhaps most importantly, the effect of the 
use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work. 84 
The determination of fair use requires a case-by-case analysis 
and is difficult to predict.85 
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). 
78. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994). As an af-
firmative defense, the defendant carries both the burden of coming forward with 
evidence and persuasion to avoid liability. [d. 
79. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 365-66. 
80. [d. at 365. 
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). 
82. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 47. 
83. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1557. 
84. Eric J. Schwartz, Address at the American Bar Association Summer Con-
ference (June 28, 1996) (transcript available in office of Proskauer Rose Goetz & 
Mendelsohn LLP); see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). 
85. Schwartz, supra note 84. In the notable decision involving the manufactur-
er of VCRs, the Supreme Court held videotaping at home to make time-shifting 
tapes of copyrighted television programs was fair use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. In 
contrast, a New York district court held a school system's taping of educational 
television broadcasts to create an educational film library for later use in class-
rooms was not fair use. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. 
Supp. 1247, 1252 ·(W.D.N.Y. 1983). Despite its commercial purpose, the Supreme 
Court held a parody of lyrics of the popular song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was not per 
se unfair use, giving the parody leeway because of its "transformative" use. Camp-
bell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177. Courts have repeatedly identified the economic effect on 
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B. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 
The Copyright Act expressly provides only for liability 
based on direct copyright infringement.86 The statute contains 
no provision for liability based on acts committed by anoth-
er.87 Rather, the courts have developed standards of third par-
ty . liability through case law, drawing from patent law and 
traditional tort theories of contributory and vicarious liabili-
ty.88 Copyright law imposes different standards of liability for 
direct, contributory, and vicarious forms of copyright infringe-
ment.89 For example, direct infringers are held to a standard 
of strict liability, assuring a high probability of successful pros-
ecution.90 Unlike direct infringement, however, contributory 
infringement requires proof of knowledge, which increases the 
difficulty of successful legal action.91 Thus, the controlling le-
gal theory affects the likelihood of success in a claim for copy-
right infringement.92 Because of the small number of cases 
involving the Internet, and their inconsistent results, the legal 
theory of liability for an online access provider is not clear.93 
The lack of clarity in characterizing the role of an access 
the market a8 the most significant of the four factors. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238. 
The Supreme Court held that Nation magazine's scoop of Time magazine's right to 
publish the first serial of President Ford's memoirs was not fair use, notwith-
standing the newsworthiness of its account of the Nixon pardon. Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 569. In its analysis, the court found that the magazine caused eco-
nomic harm by causing cancellation of Time's contract with Harper & Row. [d. at 
567. 
86. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 
(1996). 
87. [d. 
88. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 71. 
89. [d. at 74. 
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996). In contrast to copyright law, other bodies of 
law do not adopt strict liability. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 74. Defama-
tion, for example, requires knowledge for liability. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In that case, the court likened 
CompuServe, an online content-provider, to an electronic library, without any prac-
tical ability to monitor all users. [d. at 137. Consequently, the court held that 
CompuServe could not be found liable unless it knew or had reason to know of 
the defamatory statements. [d. at 140-41. 
91. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
92. Taitz, supra note 46, at 153-56. 
93. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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provider in infringing activities by computer users has serious 
implications for both the copyright owner and access provid-
er.94 For the copyright owner, legal action against an access 
provider may be one of the few avenues for economic relief.95 
Although copyright owners may have a strong legal case 
against individual users making unauthorized copies on the 
Internet, locating them may be almost impossible, and the cost 
of litigation against these individuals would likely dwarf the 
amount of any recovery.96 Consequently, if the copyright own-
er is to enjoy any practical relief, she will proceed against a de-
fendant with "deep pockets.n97 In the context of the Internet, 
the only practical "deep pocket" defendants are the access 
provider and bulletin board system operator.98 If legal action 
is not effective, the incentive to create may be jeopardized.99 
In addition, the fear of lost sales may motivate copyright own-
ers to oppose and obstruct advancement of the Internet. 100 
For the access provider, the threat of suit without knowing 
94. PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE 713 (1989) 
95. Taitz, supra note 46, at 152-59. 
96. [d. at 152. 
97. See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 94, at 713. 
98. Taitz, supra note 46, at 153-58. In Taitz's opinion, however, the viability of 
legal action against access providers is short-term because technology advances will 
circumvent the need for bulletin board systems and online service companies. [d. 
at 158. She argues that the most effective remedy to deter infringement would be 
a contributory copyright infringement suit against manufacturers of digital trans-
mission equipment. [d. at 156-58. Until the courts modify the "substantial non-in-
fringing uses" doctrine, however, Taitz believes legal action against equipment 
manufacturers will almost certainly fail. [d. at 157. 
99. [d. at 143. 
100. [d. at 146. The record industry's opposition to the introduction of the DAT 
player, a digital recording device capable of duplicating CDs on digital cassettes, 
illustrates such opposition to technological development by copyright owners. [d. at 
143-46. In 1985, Sony announced its intent to market consumer DAT recorders. 
Gary S. Lutzker, DATs All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording 
Act of 1991 - Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 145, 
172 (1992). Record companies, one of the most powerful groups of copyright own-
ers, fearing that the DAT would displace sales of CDs, opposed its introduction. 
Taitz, supra, at 146. Besides lobbying for royalty schemes and threatening to sue 
manufacturers for contributory copyright infringement, almost all record companies 
refused to produce prerecorded DATs, severely limiting the attractiveness of the 
DAT player. [d. at 147. It was not until enactment of the Audio Home Recording 
Act of 1992 ("AHRA"), seven years later, that the recorders reached the market. 
The AHRA required manufacturers to pay a royalty fee to record companies, music 
publishers and artists for every recorder and medium sold, as well as requiring 
copy prevention technology in the machines that prevented copying of anything but 
an original DAT. [d. 
15
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which legal precedents apply may chlIl its investment in the 
Internet. 101 
1. Direct infringement 
A direct infringer is defined in the Copyright Act as any-
one who violates one of the exclusive rights enumerated in 
Section 106.102 To establish direct copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid copyright and "copy-
ing" by the defendant.103 Since direct evidence of copying is 
rarely available, a plaintiff may prove copying by inference, by 
showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work 
and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar 
to the copyrighted work. 1M 
The standard for direct copyright infringement is strict 
liability, regardless of intent or knowledge. 105 According to a 
Florida federal district court, even an innocent infringer may 
be liable. 1OO In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, the publisher of 
Playboy magazine alleged that Frena, a bulletin board opera-
tor, infringed its exclusive right to distribute when subscribers 
uploaded the magazine's copyrighted photographs onto the 
bulletin board for others to download. 107 The district court 
agreed, applying the direct copyright infringement test. 108 
Even though Frena contended that subscribers, not he, up-
loaded the photographs without his knowledge, the district 
court held the bulletin board operator liable for direct infringe-
ment. 109 The court held that the plaintiff proved the requisite 
elements of copyright ownership and violation of an exclusive 
101. See Tickle, supra note 16, at 417-18 (noting the chilling effect on bulletin 
board operators if held to a strict standard. of liability); Pink, supra note I, at 
611-12 (noting online industry arguments against liability for copyright infringe-
ment by subscribers to prevent chilling effect on industry); Elkin-Koren, supra note 
16, at 406 (noting risk of liability may discourage incentive to provide online ser-
vices). 
102. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996). 
103. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556. 
lO4. [d. 
105. Pink, supra note I, at 618. 
106. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. 
107. [d. at 1554. 
108. [d. at 1554-59. 
109. [d. 
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right,110 noting that knowledge or intent to infringe is not an 
element of direct copyright infringement.111 Although direct 
copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, a fair use privi-
lege and several other defenses are available. 112 
2. Contributory infringement 
To be liable for contributory copyright infringement, the 
plaintiff must prove that the alleged contributory infringer 1) 
knew or should have known1l3 of the infringing activity1l4 
and 2) "induced, caused or materially contributed to the in-
fringing conduct of another. n115 Thus, the touchstones of con-
tributory infringement are knowledge and participation. 116 
Participation may take the form of personal conduct or the 
contribution of materials or equipment that provide the means 
of infringing.l17 
The theory of contributory infringement, derived from the 
common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in 
or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the 
prime tortfeasor,118 is a relatively recent development of copy-
right law.119 Few precedents exist in the context of copy-
right. 120 Of those cases, several key decisions have helped 
110. 1d. The Playboy court held that defendant infringed plaintiffs exclusive 
rights of distribution and display; the court made no rmding concerning the right 
of reproduction. 1d. 
111. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. 
112. See supra notes 64, 77-80 and accompanying text. 
113. Confusion persists regarding the level of knowledge required for contributo-
ry infringement in copyright law. Pink, supra note 1, at 623. Such confusion may 
exist because copyright law was created by analogy to patent law. 1d. at 623-24. 
The Patent Act requires that contributory infringers have actual knowledge. 35 
U.S.C. § 271(c) (1996). In contrast, the Supreme Court in Sony required only con-
structive knowledge in the copyright context, a far broader basis of liability. Sony, 
464 U.S. at 437-38 n.18 (1984). 
114. To be liable as a contributory infringer, the plaintiff must first establish 
direct copyright infringement by the primary infringer. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, 
at 365. 
115. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
116. Pink, supra note 1, at 621. 
117. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 372. 
118. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 
399, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
119. Tickle, supra note 16, at 405. 
120. 1d. 
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shape the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement. 121 
In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 122 the Supreme Court held a 
movie producer liable as a contributory infringer for the unau-
thorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book, Ben 
Hur. 123 The movie producer hired a writer to create a screen-
play based on the book.l24 In addition, the movie producer 
designed advertisements that depicted the film as a dramatiza-
tion of the book.125 The movie producer then sold the film to 
distributors who placed the film in theaters, giving rise to the 
producer's argument that the distributors, not he, infringed the 
copyrighted book. 126 The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that if the defendant was not liable unless he 
were the direct infringer, it would be impossible to hold a third 
party accountable. 127 This decision established the legal foun-
dation that a defendant who knowingly and actively partici-
pates in the acts preceding infringement, but who falls just 
short of committing the infringing act is liable as a contributo-
ry infringer. 128 
Another important decision, Screen Gems-Columbia Music 
v. Mark-Fi Records, highlighted the importance of knowledge 
in establishing contributory infringement. l29 In that case, 
music publishers sued a record company for reproducing its 
songs in an unauthorized album.130 More importantly, the 
music publishers also sued the particular radio stations that 
sold advertising spots for the albums, the advertising agency 
that purchased media time, and the service agency that han-
dled mail order distribution of the albums.131 The copyright 
owners asserted that anyone involved in furthering sales of the 
infringing records, with or without knowledge of the infringe-
ment, should be liable as contributory infringers.132 Rejecting 
121. Id. 
122. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). 
123. Id. at 63 
124. Id. at 60. 
125. Id. at 61. 
126. Id. at 62. 
127. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63. 
128. Tickle, supra note 16, at 405. 
129. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, 256 F. Supp. at 404. 
130. Id. at 401. 
131. Id. at 401-02. 
132. Id. at 403. 
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the assertion, the New York district court refused to impose 
contributory infringement liability unless defendants knew or 
had reason to know the album violated copyrighted works. 133 
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, the Second Circuit articulated the modem test for con-
tributory infringement. l34 The court defined a contributory 
infringer as one who knowingly "induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . ."135 In 
that case, a copyright owner sued a concert promoter for con-
tributorily causing the infringing performance of its songs by 
artists at local community concerts. l36 The defendant per-
formed a dual role: it managed the artists and also functioned 
as a concert promoter by organizing local nonprofit organiza-
tions around the country to sponsor a series of local community 
concerts.137 In holding the concert promoter liable, the circuit 
court emphasized that the promoter knew that artists would 
perform copyrighted songs at the concerts, and also created the 
venue for the artists. 138 
In the most recent development of the doctrine, Sony Corp. 
of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court limit-
ed the scope of third party liability based on the contribution of 
materials or equipment.139 In its landmark decision, the Sony 
court held that the sale of copying equipment alone does not 
constitute contributory infringement if the product is capable 
of "substantial noninfringing uses. "140 In that case, plaintiffs 
brought a contributory copyright infringement action against 
Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of video cassette record-
133. Id. at 403-05. In denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, the 
district court held that defendants could be held l,iable if plaintiff proved at trial 
that they had actual or constructive knowledge. Id. 
134. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 1160. 
137. Id. at 1160-6l. 
138. Id. at 1162-63. The circuit court also held the concert promoter liable as a 
vicarious infringer. Id. 
139. Tickle, supra note 16, at 409. 
140. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
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ers.141 Plaintiffs alleged that Sony supplied the means to ac-
complish the infringing activity of consumers who made illegal 
copies of protected works. 142 In finding the manufacturer not 
liable, the court applied a patent law principle which provides 
that the sale of staple articles of commerce suitable for sub-
stantial noninfringing uses does not constitute contributory 
infringement.143 The court reasoned that holding manufactur-
ers of such articles of commerce liable as contributory infring-
ers would ''block the wheels of commerce. "144 Courts have not 
yet decided whether the Sony limitation applies in an online 
context. 145 
Thus far, only one contributory copyright infringement 
action involving the Internet has reached judicial decision. 146 
In Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, a California district court im-
posed a preliminary injUnction against a bulletin board opera-
tor, concluding that Sega had shown a strong likelihood of 
success in establishing a prima facie case of contributory in-
fringement against the operator for unauthorized uploading 
and downloading of Sega video games by subscribers.147 The 
court found that the bulletin board operator advertised the 
video games on the bulletin board, actively solicited subscrib-
ers to download the games for a fee, and sold descrambling 
141. Id. at 422. Plaintiffs in that case were Universal City Studios and Walt 
Disney Productions. Id. at 421. Plaintiffs did not pursue any action against indi-
vidual consumers. Id. 
142. Id. at 420. 
143. Id. at 440; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1996). The Sony court ruled that the VCR 
was capable of substantial noninfringing use, specifically time-shifting taping of 
television programs, finding that even if unauthorized, the taping was a fair use. 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-56. 
144. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441. 
145. Tickle, supra note 16, at 410. . 
146. Id. at 399-400. A contributory and vicarious copyright infringement action 
was brought in a California district court in 1995 by copyright holders of texts of 
the Church of Scientology against Netcom, an Internet access provider, for the in-
fringing activities of a bulletin board subscriber. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 136l. 
The case settled recently. See infra notes 171-234 and accompanying text. In 1993, 
the Music Publisher's Association filed suit against CompuServe in a New York 
district court for contributory copyright infringement of hundreds of songs uploaded 
and downloaded by bulletin board subscribers. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, 
No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. med Nov. 19, 1993). That case settled on December 19, 
1995. Raysman & Brown, supra note 62, at 3. This was the first legal action in-
volving copyright infringement of music on the Internet. Pink, supra note 1, at 
609. 
147. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687-89. 
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equipment necessary to copy the games. l48 Although the oper-
ator had not directly placed copies of Sega's game programs 
onto the system, the court determined that its role in providing 
facilities, direction, and encouragement materially contributed 
to the infringing conduct of others. 149 
3. Vicarious infringement 
To establish vicarious liability, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant 1) had the right and ability to control the 
direct infringer and 2) had a financial interest in the infringe-
ment. 150 Vicarious liability requires neither knowledge nor 
participation. lSI Rather, a person may be liable for vicarious 
infringement "when the right and ability to supervise coalesce 
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation 
of copyrighted materials .... "152 Thus, the focus is on the re-
lationship between the defendant and the direct infringer. 153 
Traditionally, precedent for vicarious copyright infringe-
ment liability has divided along the lines of two genres of rela-
tionships - landlord-tenant and dance hall operators. 1M Un-
der the first genre, courts have held that a landlord who leases 
her property at a fixed rental to a tenant who engages in copy-
right-infringing activity on the premises is not liable because 
148. [d. at 683-85. 
149. [d. at 686-87. 
150. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
151. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3. 
152. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
153. Tickle, supra note 16, at 410. 
154. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. The theory of vicarious .liability stems from the 
tort doctrine of respondeat superior. Segal, supra note 2, at 128. Under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement by an employee. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 287 
F.2d 478, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1961) (holding theater 
owner vicariously liable for copyright infringement by piano player employee even 
though employer had no knowledge of infringement); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 
Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (D.C. La. 1942) (holding dance hall operator vicari-
ously liable for infringement by orchestra despite instructions not to play copy-
righted materials). This relationship model, however, does not apply in the online 
context because an employment relationship does not exist between the access pro-
vider or bulletin board operator and the computer user. Tickle, supra note 16 at 
412. Even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the courts have 
imposed liability in other business relationships. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. 
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she had no control over the leased premises. 155 In a seminal 
case, Deutsch v. Arnold, the Second Circuit established that 
something more than the mere relationship of landlord and 
tenant must exist to give rise to vicarious liability.1s6 In that 
case, the circuit court held that a landlord who leased outdoor 
space to a tenant who sold infringing handwriting analysis 
charts was not vicariously liable.157 In its analysis, the court 
found that the landlord leased the property at a fIxed rental 
and received no fInancial benefIt from the acts of infringe-
ment. l58 In further support of its fInding that the landlord 
was not liable under any theory of infringement, the court 
found that the landlord had no knowledge of infringing activi-
ties at the time the lease was executed. 159 
In the "dance hall" cases, however, the courts have held 
dance hall operators liable for infringing performances by en-
tertainers because they exercise control by leasing the premis-
es or hiring the bands and receive profIts from patrons who 
pay to attend performances. 1OO For example, in Dreamland 
Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 161 the Seventh Circuit 
held the dance hall operator liable for the infringing perfo!-
mance of copyrighted songs played by the orchestra it hired 
because the dance hall stood to make a profIt from the perfor-
mance.162 In its analysis, the Dreamland Ball Room court 
found that hiring the orchestra to play music to increase its 
audience created liability for the dance hall proprietor irrespec-
155. See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding landlord 
not liable for sales by tenant of infringing handwriting analysis charts due to lack 
of knowledge and financial benefit); Fromont v. AEolian Co., 254 F. 592, 594 
(D.C.N.Y. 1918) (holding landlord not liable for infringing performance of "Claire 
De Lune" by pianist who leased concert hall at fixed rental due to lack of knowl-
edge, control or financial benefit). 
156. Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 688. 
157. [d. 
158. [d. 
159. [d. 
160. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931) 
(holding hotel proprietor liable for infringing performance of unlicensed musical 
compositions on radio broadcasts aired on speakers in hotel); Famous Music Corp. 
v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st 
Cir. 1977) (holding race track owner liable for infringing performance over public 
address system of musical compositions supplied by independent contractor). 
161. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 
(7th Cir. 1929). 
162. [d. 
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tive of whether the orchestra was an employee or independent 
contractor or whether the dance hall operator selected the 
music or knew that the music was copyrighted. 163 
The leading case to synthesize the "dance-hall" model and 
the landlord-tenant model, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. B.L. 
Green, articulated the two-prong test of control and financial 
interest. l64 The infringing party in Shapiro had a concession 
to operate a record store in defendant's department stores. l65 
Under terms of their lease agreement, the store owner retained 
the right to supervise the concessionaire's employees and re-
ceived 10% of gross sales. l66 Determining that the relation-
ship between the store owner and concessionaire was closer to 
the dance-hall model than to the landlord-tenant model, the 
Shapiro court held the store owner vicariously liable for the 
sale of "bootleg" records. 167 In reaching its determination, the 
court found that the lease gave the store owner power to exer-
cise control over business activities on the premises as well as 
employee conduct, and the right to a percentage of profits es-
tablished a direct financial interest in the exploitation of the 
copyrighted materials. 166 
In the online context, the two-prong test of control and 
financial interest means that a copyright holder must prove 
that an access provider has the ability to monitor and control 
thousands of postings by computer users and show a direct 
financial interest in the infringing acts of subscribers.169 To 
determine vicarious liability, courts must decide if the relation-
ship between an access provider and direct infringer is closer 
on the spectrum to the dance-hall model or landlord-tenant 
model. 170 
163. Id. 
164. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. 
165. Id. at 305. 
166. Id. at 306. 
167. Id. at 308. 
168. Id. at 307-08. 
169. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text for articulation of test for 
vicarious liability. 
170. Tickle. supra note 16. at 405. 
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C. AN ACCESS PROVIDER'S LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS 
TECHNOLOGY CENTER V. NETCOM ON-LINE COMMUNICATIONS 
SERVICES 
In the fIrst case to directly address the issue of an Internet 
access provider's copyright infringement liability, Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom,171 a California federal district 
court considered all three traditional theories: direct, contribu-
tory, and vicarious liability.172 In ruling on a pre-trial motion, 
the court held that Netcom, one of the industry's largest access 
providers,173 was not directly or vicariously liable for the in-
fringing acts of a bulletin board subscriber.174 The court, how-
ever, raised the possibility Netcom might be held contributorily 
liable if the plaintiff proved knowledge.175 Before the issue of 
liability was resolved, the parties settled out-of-court. 176 Even 
so, an examination of the court's analytic approach is useful in 
revealing the approach future courts may take. 
1. Facts and procedural history 
This copyright infringement action arose from unautho-
rized Internet postings by a bulletin board subscriber.177 The 
subscriber, a former Scientology minister who became a vocal 
church critic, posted messages on a private bulletin board 
service. 178 The Church of Scientology, through its Religious 
Technology Center,179 alleged that the subscriber infringed its 
copyrights when he posted confIdential lectures1so by the 1ate 
171. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
172. Id. at 1367 n.9. 
173. ISPs Double in Number Despite Industry Giants, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 
1996, at C4. Netcom has upwards of 500,000 subscribers. Id. 
174. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-77. 
175. Id. at·1373. 
176. Benjamin Pimentel, Netcom Settles Scientology Copyright Suit, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 5, 1996, at A22. 
177. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66. 
178. Id. 
179. Plaintiffs Religious Technology Center and Bridge Publications, both non-
profit California corporations affiliated with the Church of Scientology, hold copy-
rights in the works of the Church's founder, L. Ron Hubbard. Id. 
180. The Church claimed many of its literary works were copyrighted and also 
trade secrets for a spiritual healing technology, referred to as the Advanced Tech-
nology works. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servic-
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founder of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard.181 The subscriber ad-
dressed his message to a Usenet newsgroup182 organized ex-
clusively to discuss and criticize the Scientology religion. 183 
Although not directly linked to the Internet, the bulletin board 
operator gained access by contracting with Netcom. l84 Once 
the subscriber posted the message, Netcom's computers auto-
matically copied and transmitted the message to other Usenet 
sites via the computer network system of the Internet. 185 
Shortly, the message was accessible to bulletin board subscrib-
ers throughout the world, available for downloading to their 
own computers. 186 
The Church notified Netcom and the bulletin board service 
operator about the alleged infringement, but both refused to do 
anything about it.187 In February, 1995, the Church sued the 
es, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (1995). The Ninth Circuit described the Church's 
teachings as a belief that a person's behavior and well-being are improved by re-
moving "engrams" from the unconscious mind. Religious Technology Ctr. v. 
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 
(1987). Engrams are impressions recorded in the unconscious mind in times of 
trauma which return in moments of stress. Removing engrams from one's uncon-
scious permits the person's mind to function unhindered. Engrams are purged 
through "auditing," which uses the "advanced technology" of the Church. The 
Church asserted that the unsupervised, premature exposure to the Advanced Tech-
nology course materials would have a spiritually harmful effect. [d. During his 
years with the Church, from approximately 1968 until 1982, the defendant former 
minister received training to provide counseling services, known as "auditing." Reli-
gious Technology Center, 923 F. Supp. at 1238-39. 
181. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66. 
182. The Usenet has been described as a worldwide network of electronic bulle-
tin boards. [d. at 1365 n.4. It is one of the most popular methods of communica-
tion on the Internet. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Messages are divided into topical "newsgroups." Netcom, 
907 F. Supp. at 1365 n.4. The Usenet system functions as a public discussion fo-
rum or "chat room" on the Internet, a way for people around the world to ex-
change information and debate topics which interest them. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 
834-35. The former minister posted his message to "alt.religion.scientology," the 
Usenet newsgroup organized solely to discuss and criticize Scientology. Netcom, 
907 F. Supp. at 1365-66. Using many computer network systems, including the 
Internet, each Usenet server automatically distributes its users' postings to other 
Usenet sites that subscribe to the newsgroup for review by individual users. 
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36. Similarly, responses to messages are automatically 
distributed to all other host computers for that newsgroup. Periodically, messages 
are automatically purged from each system to make room for new messages. [d. 
183. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. at 1367-68. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. at 1368. Netcom contended that it would be impossible to prescreen the 
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subscriber, the bulletin board operator, and Netcom for copy-
right infringement, seeking damages and injunctive relief. 188 
2. Court's analysis and conclusion 
In November, 1995, the federal district court held that the 
access provider was not directly or vicariously liable.189 How-
ever, the court concluded that the existence of a genuine issue 
of fact as to Netcom's knowledge of the infringement precluded 
granting Netcom's motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of contributory infringement. 190 The court indicated that 
N etcom may have been contributorily liable by failing to re-
move the infringing documents if plaintiff could prove Netcom 
had knowledge of the infringement. 191 
a. Direct infringement 
Although acknowledging that Netcom was not itself the 
source of the infringing materials, the Church alleged that 
Netcom was liable either directly, contributorily, or vicarious-
ly.192 Regarding direct liability, the Church pointed out that 
Netcom's computers made copies of the infringing materials 
and stored them in its memory system for a short period of 
time.193 N etcom argued that copying was a necessary fwiction 
subscriber's postings. [d. at 1366. To remove the subscriber from the Internet, 
Netcom argued, would entail closing off Internet access to all of the other bulletin 
board subscribers. [d. 
188. Religious Technology Center, 923 F. Supp. at 1240. The suit also claimed 
misappropriation of trade secrets by the subscriber. [d. In February, 1995, the dis-
trict court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the subscriber from further 
copying of the protected religious works. [d. at 1258. The court also authorized a 
writ of seizure directing authorities to raid the subscriber's home to seize copy-
righted documents. [d. at 1240. The writ was later vacated for defects. [d. at 
1265. In September, 1995, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the 
subscriber to enjoin further posting of Scientology materials on the Internet. [d. 
189. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-77. The analysis in this Comment focuses on 
the liability of the access provider defendant only. See infra notes 171-234 and ac-
companying text. 
190. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1381. 
191. Id. at 1374. 
192. [d. at 1367. 
193. [d. at 1370. 
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of the computer network system, that it did not take any affir-
mative action other than implementing a software system that 
automatically made· copies of messages to retransmit onto the 
Usenet network. l94 Netcom compared itself to a common car-
rier that merely acts as a passive conduit for information. 195 
To establish a claim of direct copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and "copy-
iIig" of a protectable expression by the defendant. l96 Although 
the Netcom court agreed that copying occurred,197 pointing to 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAl v. Peak Computer/9S the 
court refused to hold the access provider directly liable. l99 In 
its analysis, the court distinguished the factual setting in 
MAl.2oo In MAl, a computer service technician booted up a 
computer to check its error log to diagnose a problem.201 In so 
doing, the copyrighted operating system software was loaded 
into the computer's random access memory, thus creating a 
copy.202 Unlike the defendant in MAl, Netcom did not initiate 
the copying.203 Rather, the court found that Netcom's comput-
er system automatically made a temporary copy of all data 
sent through it as a necessary function to forward messages 
onto the Usenet system and that the copying involved no hu-
man intervention.204 The court reasoned that some element of 
volition must exist for direct liability.205 The Netcom court ex-
pressed concern that, carried to its natural extreme, plaintift's 
theory would result in unreasonable liability, implicating every 
194. [d. at 1368. Netcom also argued, alternatively, it had a fair use privilege. 
[d. at 1378. 
195. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. The court disagreed with the analogy, 
noting that Internet access providers are not natural monopolies that are bound to 
carry all traffic without any control over who or what was on its system. [d. 
196. [d. at 1366-67. 
197. [d. at 1368. 
198. MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding repair person made copy of system software in computer's random access 
memory when he booted up computer). 
199. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73. 
200. [d. at 1368. 
201. MAl, 991 F.2d at 518. 
202. [d. at 518. 
203. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368. 
204. [d. at 1368-70. 
205. [d. 
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single Usenet server in the worldwide link.206 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that Netcom was not directly liable for the 
incidental copying of the subscriber's infringing materials in its 
computer storage system and retransmission to other host 
computers. 207 
b. Contributory infringement 
The Church asserted that Netcom had knowledge of the 
infringing postings, at least after plaintiffs notified them by 
letter.206 Despite such knowledge, Netcom failed to remove 
the· infringing materials or bar the bulletin board subscriber 
from further access to the Scientology newsgroup.209 Netcom 
made several arguments in its defense.21o First, Netcom ar-
gued that it did not know of the subscriber's intention to in-
fringe when it contracted with the bulletin board operator to 
provide access to the Internet.211 The access provider cited 
cases holding that a landlord is not contributorily liable for 
infringing activities of its tenants on its premises unless the 
landlord had knowledge of the ·intended infringing use at the 
time the lease was signed.212 In addition, Netcom argued that 
it did not know that the subscriber would infringe prior to the 
postings.213 Next, Netcom contended that it did not have the 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 1372-73. In its analysis, the court also distinguished Playboy v. 
Frena. Id. at 1370. In Playboy, the court held the bulletin board operator directly 
liable for infringing the rights to publicly distribute and display works. Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Since the Church 
did not allege infringement of the right to display, the Netcom court concluded the 
Playboy decision had no bearing on the issue of direct liability for unauthorized 
reproduction, thus finding the case inapplicable. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370. 
The Netcom court also distinguished Sega v. MAPHIA, noting the court mixed ele-
ments of contributory infringement in its discussion of direct infringement. Id. at 
1371. Notwithstanding the Sega court's holding of direct liability, the Netcom court 
disagreed, based on its opinion that the theory of holding the Internet system lia-
ble is unworkable because it is practically impossible to screen out infringing from 
noninfringing content. Id. at 1372-73. 
208. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373. 
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ability to screen out infringing messages before they were 
posted.214 Further, Netcom argued that its knowledge was too 
equivocal in light of the difficulty of assessing valid copyright 
registration and any fair use defense.215 
To establish liability as a contributory infringer; plaintiff 
must prove the defendant had knowledge of the infringement 
and participated by "inducing, causing or materially contribut-
ing to the infringing conduct of another.,,216 In its analysis of 
the knowledge component of the test, the Netcom court rejected 
Netcom's argument that proof of valid copyright was too diffi-
cult to verify, given that the works contained copyright notic-
es.217 However, the court was persuaded that Netcom might 
be able to show that its lack of knowledge was reasonable. 218 
The court reasoned that an access provider might not be able 
to quickly determine if a work infringes when a colorable de-
fense of fair use exists.219 Thus, a genuine issue of fact relat-
ing to the theory of contributory infringement precluded the 
court from granting Netcom's motion for summary judg-
ment.220 
In its analysis of the participation component of the test, 
the Netcom court concluded that Netcom's failure to cancel the 
subscriber's message constituted substantial participation.221 
To illustrate, the court compared the access provider to radio 
stations that were found liable for rebroadcasting infringing 
broadcasts rather than to a swap meet operator who rents 
space to an infringer and is not liable.222 The court reasoned 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).· 
217. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374. 
218. Id. at 1374. 
219. [d. at 1374-75. In analyzing the fair use defense, the court stressed that 
the proper focus was whether Netcom's actions qualified as fair use, not whether 
the subscriber engaged in fair use. Id. at 1378. The court did not fmd that 
Netcom's use was fair, noting a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the 
postings could harm the market for the religious works. Id. at 1380-81. 
220. Id. at 1374-75. 
221. Id. 
222. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. The Netcom court cited Select Theatres 
Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (holding ra-
dio station liable for infringing rebroadcasts) and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
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that providing a service for automatic distribution of U senet 
postings, infringing and noninfringing, went well beyond sim-
ply renting space to an infringer.223 Further, the court rea-
soned, Netcom's failure to remove the message substantially 
aided in the accomplishment of the infringement.224 Thus, the 
court concluded that if plaintiffs proved knowledge, the access 
provider may be contributorily liable.225 
c. Vicarious infringement 
The Church alleged that N etcom had the right and ability 
to control the use of its system, pointing to contract terms with 
Netcom subscribers that reserved the right to take remedial 
action, prohibited copyright infringement, and indemnified it 
for any damage to third parties.226 Further, the Church al-
leged that Netcom had policed the conduct of users in the past, 
pointing to evidence of suspensions of Netcom subscribers for 
commercial advertising, off-topic postings, and posting obscene 
materials.227 The Church also asserted that N etcom somehow 
derived a financial benefit from its failure to enforce violations 
of copyright law.228 Netcom contended it was unable to screen 
messages before they were posted given the speed and volume 
of the data that goes through its system.229 
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant has the right and ability to control the infringer's 
acts and receives a direct financial benefit from the infringe-
ment.230 In its analysis of the right and ability to control, the 
court found plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of fact as to 
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding swap meet operator not li-
able for infringing sales of bootleg records by vendors). [d. The Netcom court did 
not have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa reversing the low-
er court. See infra notes 240-83. 
223. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
224. [d. 
225. [d. at 1374. 
226. [d. at 1375-76. 
227. [d. at 1376. 
228. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. 
229. [d. 
230. [d.; see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d 
Cir. 1963) (articulating vicarious liability test of control and financial interest). 
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Netcom's right and ability to exercise control over its subscrib-
ers.231 In its analysis of direct financial benefit, the Netcom 
court concluded plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to 
support its assertions.232 The court reasoned that unlike the 
percentage of gross sales in Shapiro, Netcom received a fixed 
fee.233 For these reasons, the court held Netcom not vicarious-
ly liable.234 
III. DISCUSSION 
Although the environment of a swap meet is a strange 
context for a legal discussion concerning leading edge technolo-
gy, the recent decision in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction235 may 
have a significant impact on liability issues for the digital 
environment of Internet access providers.236 The case is sig-
nificant because the copyright infringement dispute discussed 
in the case concerns contributory and vicarious liability, the 
case is recent,237 it is an appellate level decision in the Ninth 
Circuit, and it reversed a lower court dismissal that was cited 
prominently in the Netcom case.23S By applying the legal 
principles in Fonovisa to the facts in Netcom, this Comment 
theorizes that future courts may hold an online access provider 
both contributorily liable and vicariously liable for the infring-
ing conduct of subscribers.239 
A. A SWAP MEET OPERATOR'S THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN 
FONOVISA V. CHERRY AUCTION 
In holding that the plaintiff established a claim against 
the swap meet operator for vicarious and contributory infringe-
ment for the sale of bootleg records by vendors, the Ninth 
Circuit court identified circumstances to impose third party 
231. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. 
232. [d. at 1377. 
233. [d. 
234. [d. 
235. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
236. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3. 
237. Fonovisa was. decided January 25, 1996. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259. 
238 .. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
239. See infra notes 287-353 and accompanying text. 
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liability that may subject an online access provider to more 
rigorous scrutiny.240 The Fonovisa court expanded the ways 
to show direct financial benefit and characterized the provision 
of a site and support services as materially contributing to in-
fringing activities of another.241 
1. Facts and procedural history 
Cherry Auction operated a swap meet in Fresno, Califor-
nia, similar to hundreds of other "flea markets" across the 
country where customers come to buy various merchandise 
from individual vendors.242 Cherry Auction collected a daily 
rental fee from independent vendors in exchange for booth 
space, as well as entrance fees from each customer who attend-
ed the swap meet.243 Cherry Auction also supplied parking, 
promoted the meet in advertisements, and retained the right to 
exclude any vendor for any reason at any time.244 
At its swap meet in Fresno, independent vendors repeated-
ly sold counterfeit recordings in violation of copyright and 
trademark rules.245 The Cherry Auction operators were 
undisputedly aware of these sales.246 In prior years, the 
Sheriffs Department had raided the swap meet and seized 
more than 38,000 counterfeit recordings. 247 When sales of 
counterfeit recordings did not abate, the Sheriff's Department 
sent a warning letter to Cherry Auction to stop the infringing 
activities.246 
In February, 1993, Fonovisa, Inc. (hereinafter "Fonovisa"), 
a California corporation that owned copyrights and trademarks 
to Latin and Hispanic music recordings, brought an action 
against Cherry Auction for direct, contributory and vicarious 
240. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 262-64. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 261. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 260-61. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
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copyright infringement.249 The district court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).250 The dis-
trict court held that Fonovisa did not meet either the control or 
the financial benefit prong of the vicarious liability test.251 
The court reasoned that the collection of a flat fee for booth 
rentals did not constitute a direct financial interest.252 In its 
view, Cherry Auction was in the same position as an absentee 
landlord who has surrendered its right of occupancy to its ten-
ants.253 The district court concluded that Cherry Auction nei-
ther supervised nor profited from vendors' sales.254 In dis-
missing the claim of contributory infringement, the district 
court concluded that merely renting booth space to vendors did 
not constitute substantial participation.255 
The Ninth Circuit strongly disagreed.256 On appeal, the 
circuit court reversed the district court's dismissal, remanding 
the case to the trial COurt.257 The appellate court held that 
the complaint stated a cause of action for both· contributory 
and vicarious copyright infringement.258 
2. Court's analysis 
On appeal, Fonovisa did not challenge the district court's 
dismissal of its claim for direct infringement, but did appeal 
the dismissal of its claims for contributory and vicarious in-
fringement.259 The court analyzed Fonovisa under each of the 
two theories of liability. 260 
249. [d. 
250. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 26l. 
251. [d. at 262. 
252. [d. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. 
255. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
256. [d. at 262-64. 
257. [d. at 265. 
258. [d. at 264. The Ninth Circuit also held that the complaint stated a cause 
of action for contributory trademark iDfringement. [d. at 265. However, trademark 
issues are beyond the focus of this Comment. 
259. [d. at 26l. 
260. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64. 
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a. Contributory infringement 
Liability for contributory infringement requires knowledge 
and participation in the infringing conduct of another.261 In 
its analysis, the Ninth Circuit court stated that Cherry Auction 
knew that vendors repeatedly sold counterfeit records at its 
swap meet, based on evidence of a raid by the Sheriffs Depart-
ment and a warning letter sent by the Sheriff.262 The dispute 
focused on whether Cherry Auction participated in the infring-
ing acts.263 Cherry Auction contended it was a passive partici-
pant, providing only rental space.2M Contrary to Cherry 
Auction's characterization and the district court's view that 
participation means expressly promoting or encouraging the 
sale of counterfeit products,265 the Fonovisa court embraced 
the Third Circuit's view that simply providing the site and 
facilities for infnnging activities was sufficient to establish 
contributory liability.266 The Fonovisa court reasoned that in 
providing a site, plumbing, utilities, parking, advertising, and 
customers for the illicit sales, Cherry Auction materially con-
tributed to the infringing activities.267 Indeed, the court stat-
ed, it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place 
in the massive quantities alleged without such support services 
from the swap meet.268 Thus, the court held that Fonovisa 
established a claim against Cherry Auction for contributory 
infringement.269 
261. Id. at 264. 
262. Id. at 261. 
263. Id. at 264. 
264. Id. 
265. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal. 
1994) (hereinafter "Fonovisa I") 
266. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, 
Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986». 
267. [d. 
268. [d. 
269. [d. 
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b. Vicarious infringement 
Vicarious liability requires the right and ability to control 
the infringer and also a direct financial interest in the in-
fringement.270 Regarding the element of control, Fonovisa al-
leged that Cherry Auction had the contractual right to termi-
nate vendors for any reason, arguing that through that right it 
had the ability to control and police the activities of vendors on 
the premises.271 In addition, Fonovisa alleged that. Cherry 
Auction promoted the swap meet and controlled access to the 
swap meet area.272 Cherry Auction contended that it neither 
supervised nor profited from vendor sales.273 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that Cherry Auc-
tion wielded broad control over the direct iruringers under its 
contract rights to police the vendors.274 The court reasoned 
that the ability to police, whether exerted or not, is sufficient 
control to satisfy the control element of vicarious liability.275 
In reaching its determination, the court found that Cherry 
Auction's participation as a promoter and organizer enabled it 
to wield control over the infringing vendors.276 
As to the fmancial benefit analysis, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Cherry Auction derived a financial benefit from 
the illegal vendor sales.277 Cherry Auction contended that it 
received merely a fixed rental fee rather than a commission on 
270. [d. at 262. 
271. FOTU)visa, 76 F.3d at 262. 
272. [d. 
273. [d. 
274. Id. at 262-63. The court noted striking fact similarities with Shapiro v. 
Green in which a contract with the concessionaire vested broad control in the store 
owner over employee conduct and activities on the premises, sufficient to establish 
vicarious liability. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
275. Id. The Ninth Circuit appeared to embrace the reasoning of the court in 
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1163 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding concert promoter vicariously liable for infringing activ-
ities of concert artists) by reference. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263; see also Polygram 
Intern. Pub., Inc. v. NevadaJTIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D. Mass. 1984) 
(finding computer trade show organizer wielded control over exhibitors through 
contract rules). 
276. FOTU)visa, 76 F.3d at 263. In its analysis, the court compared Cherry Auc-
tion to the concert promoter in Gershwin. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63. 
277. Id. at 263. 
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vendors' gross receipts as in the Shapiro27S fact setting.279 
Nonetheless, the Fonovisa court saw similarities to the dance 
hall cases in which the dance hall operators benefited by the 
number of patrons drawn to performances of infringing mu-
sic.28O The court reasoned that the sale of pirated recordings 
at the swap meet acted as a draw for customers.2S1 Besides 
the flat fee Cherry Auction collected for booth rental, the court 
found that the swap meet operator collected admission fees, 
parking fees and concession sales, flowing directly from cus-
tomers who came to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain 
basement prices.2S2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit also found that 
Fonovisa stated a claim for vicarious copyright infringe-
ment.283 
B. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
LIABILITY IN FONOVISA TO NETCOM 
Whether the Netcom court would have analyzed the liabili-
ty of the access provider differently if it had the benefit of the 
Ninth Circuit's Fonovisa opinion is an open question.284 The 
Netcom decision fell in time between the district court's opinion 
in Fonovisa and the Ninth Circuit's reversal of that opin-
ion.285 Nevertheless, a post-settlement review of Netcom that 
extrapolates the Fonovisa court's analytic approach may reveal 
the circumstances in which future courts may hold an online 
278. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
279. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
280. [d. at 263-64. 
281. [d. 
282. [d. 
283. [d. at 264. 
284. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33. 
285. [d. Netcom was decided November 21, 1995. Religious Technology Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
Fonovisa was decided January 25, 1996. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 
F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). On February 16, 1996, copyright holders in Netcom filed 
a motion to reconsider based on the theory of a change in controlling law on vi-
carious liability as a result of the appellate court's decision in Fonovisa. Plaintiffs 
Motion to Reconsider at 1:20-25, Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. 
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. 95-20091). On March 4, 1996, the court denied 
the motion to reconsider, finding no inconsistency between the district court's hold-
ing and the appellate court decision in Fonovisa. Order Den. Leave to File Mot. 
for Recons. at 1-2, Netcom (No. 95-20091). 
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access provider liable for the infringing activities of subscrib-
ers. This Comment applies the legal principles of vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringement liability in Fonovisa to the 
factual setting in Netcom. 286 
1. Vicarious copyright infringement of an online access pro-
vider 
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that an 
access provider 1) has the right and ability to control the direct 
infringer's acts and 2) receives a direct financial benefit from 
the infringement.287 In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the plaintiff stated a claim for vicarious liability because the 
swap meet operator not only controlled the activities of ven-
dors, but also profited from the sales of counterfeit records by 
attracting more bargain hunters, thus resulting in more collat-
eral fees to the swap meet operator.288 The Fonovisa court's 
holding raises the possibility that an access provider may be 
vicariously liable for the infringing activities of its subs crib-
ers.289 
a. Right and ability to control the direct infringer's conduct 
The Fonovisa court concluded that the swap meet operator 
had the right and ability to control the direct infringers.29o 
Based on explicit contract rights to terminate vendors for any 
reason, the court found that the swap meet operator was in a 
position to police the vendors and their activities.291 In addi-
tion, the court found that the swap meet operator wielded 
control over vendors and customers by virtue of its role in 
promoting and organizing the swap meet, irrespective of con-
tractual control. 292 
286. See infra notes 287-354 and accompanying text. 
287. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
288. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64. 
289. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 33. 
290. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63. 
291. [d. 
292. Id. 
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In applying the control prong of the Fonovisa court's anal-
ysis of vicarious liability to Netcom, a court would find that the 
access provider had the right to supervise and control the con-
duct of its subscribers because of its contractual rights.293 
Similar to contract terms between the swap meet operator and 
vendors, the court would point to terms in Netcom's contract 
reserving the right to suspend a subscriber's account.294 As. 
evidence that Netcom exercised its control over user's activi-
ties, the court would also point to evidence in the record citing 
over one thousand instances of suspensions of subscribers' 
accounts.295 In addition, a court would point to other contract 
terms prohibiting copyright infringement and requiring indem-
nification as further evidence of Netcom's right to control sub-
scriber conduct.296 Based on such rights, the court would con-
clude that the access provider was in a position to police sub-
scribers and their posting activities on the Internet. 
Although the Fonovisa court described an alternative 
method of wielding control by promoting and organizing the 
entertainment venue, the court would not find that Netcom 
resembled the swap meet operator in that respect.297 No evi-
dence indicated that the access provider exercised control of 
subscribers by promoting or organizing the Scientology 
newsgroup or any other use of its system.298 Thus, the court 
would rely on contract rights to support its conclusion that the 
access provider in Netcom had the right and ability to control 
the conduct of its subscribers.299 
The Fonovisa analysis, however, is inapplicable to Netcom 
293. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text for discussion of the control 
element of vicarious liability by the Fonovisa court. 
294. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. The court noted that even though Netcom 
had no contractual relationship with the direct infringer, it had the right and abil-
ity to control the use of its system through its contractual relationship with the 
bulletin board operator. [d. at 1376 n.22. 
295. [d. at 1376. These suspensions were for reasons other than copyright in-
fringement, such as posting off-topic messages, commercial advertising, and posting 
obscene materials. [d. 
296. [d. 
297. See Gershwin , 443 F.2d at 1163 (finding concert promoter in position to 
control direct infringer). 
298. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76. 
299. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's discus-
sion of Cherry Auction's control through contractual rights. 
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because of the special context of its digital environment.30o In. 
the framework of a swap meet, the Fonovisa court focused 
strictly on the aspect of the "right" to control the direct 
infringer's conduct, and collapsed that concept into the "ability" 
aspect of the control test.301 The setting in Fonovisa, however, 
is distinguishable from the digital environment in Netcom. 302 
Unlike the contained geographical space of a swap meet, the 
electronic space of the Internet has no physical boundaries.303 
Moreover, an access provider's technical capability to patrol 
the Internet is a contentious issue.304 The volume of mes-
sages and speed of transmission pose formidable technical 
challenges to an access provider to screen messages before its 
host computer transmits bulletin board messages via the 
Internet.305 Netcom stated it did not have software capability 
to screen messages before they travel the Internet nor the 
ability to determine whether a message is an infringing 
one.306 Since the Fonovisa court did not address the aspect of 
"ability" specifically, it is uncertain whether an access provider 
has the "right and ability to control" subscriber's conduct. 
b. Direct financial benefit 
In considering the second element of direct financial bene-
fit, the Fonovisa court looked beyond the fixed rental fee the 
swap meet operator received from vendors and concluded that 
the operator derived substantial financial benefits from the 
300. See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text. 
301. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63. 
302. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text for factual setting in 
Fonovisa. 
303. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 
1996). 
304. See supra notes 208-09, 214, 221-29 and accompanying text. 
305. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. Netcom estimated that 150 million key 
strokes of information passed over its transmission lines per day. Netcom's Mem. 
of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, n. 16, Religious Technology Ctr. v. 
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. 95-20091). 
306. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. The court noted the lack of evidence to in-
dicate that Netcom or anyone could design software that could determine whether 
a posting is infringing. [d. at 1376 n.23. 
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infringing sales.307 In reaching its determination, the court 
reflected that the swap meet operator's revenues increased in 
direct proportion to the number of customers attracted by the 
sale of counterfeit records at bargain basement prices.30S The 
court pointed out that in addition to a fIxed daily rental fee 
from vendors for booth space, the operator collected admission 
fees, parking fees, and food concession sales from custom-
ers.309 
In applying the Fonovisa court's analysis, the court would 
fInd that Netcom derived a direct fInancial benefIt because of 
incremental increases in the number of subscribers drawn to 
its service to exploit the presence of copyrighted materials. 310 
The court would point out that although Netcom only collected 
a flat rate irrespective of usage by subscribers, the access pro-
vider collected "extra" fees from more subscribers attracted to 
the Internet.3l1 Thus, in expanding the ways to show fInan-
cial benefIt, the court would fInd that Netcom derived direct 
fInancial benefIt from more subscribers because of the infring-
ing activities.312 
Here too, the Fonovisa court's analysis is incomplete be-
cause of the complexity of the role of ~ Internet access provid-
er.313 Unlike the additional sources of revenue flowing direct-
ly from customers attracted to the swap meet, the access pro-
vider does not reap any extra fees from subscribers who might 
download infringing material.314 Netcom's service has no 
counterpart to parking fees or profIts from concession 
sales.315 An access provider, dissimilar from a content provid-
er, has no proprietary interest in the information available on 
its system.316 
307. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (discussing element of financial benefit under 
theory of vicarious liabilty). 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
314. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77. 
315. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
316. See supra note 26 and accompanying text on distinction between access 
provider and content provider. 
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Even if the presence of infringing works made the Internet 
more attractive, an increase in subscribers to the Internet 
would not necessarily benefit Netcom.317 Postings of the 
Church's religious works were equally accessible from any of 
the tens of thousands of Usenet sites that hosted the 
Scientology newsgroup.318 Thus, a new subscriber could sign 
up with any access provider, not necessarily Netcom, to access 
the religious works.319 The copyright holders in Netcom intro-
duced no evidence to show that. the infringing po stings attract-
ed new subscribers or otherwise contributed directly to the 
access provider's financial success.320 
In applying the Fonovisa court's vicarious copyright in-
fringement analysis to Netcom, however, the court would likely 
find that plaintiffs proved both the elements of control and 
financial benefit.321 Thus, the court would hold N etcom vicar-
iously liable. 322 
2. Contributory copyright infringement of an online access 
provider 
The different contexts of a swap meet and the digitized 
environment of the Internet complicate the analysis. of the 
theory of contributory copyright infringement as well.323 To 
establish liability as a contributory infringer, the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant 1) knew or should have known of the 
infringing activity and 2) participated by inducing, causing or 
materially contributing to the infringing conduct of anoth-
er.324 In Fonovisa, the court held the swap meet operator lia-
ble as a contributory infringer because the swap meet operator 
was both aware of the sales of bootleg records by vendors, and 
317. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
318. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834. 
319. [d. 
320. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377. 
321. See supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's analysis 
of vicarious liability. 
322. See supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra notes 113-49 and accompanying text for discussion of contributo-
ry liability. 
324. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437-38 
n.18 (1984). 
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materially contributed to the illicit sales by providing the ven-
ue and advertising support to attract customers.325 
a. Knowledge 
The Fonovisa court concluded that, based on the pleadings, 
the swap meet operator had unequivocal knowledge of the 
infringing sales.326 Based on a raid by the Sheriff's Depart-
ment, confiscation of thousands of counterfeit tape recordings 
at the swap meet, and written notification by the Sheriff of 
continuing counterfeit sales by vendors, the court held that the 
swap meet operators were clearly on notice of the infringing 
activities.327 A court applying the Fonovisa analysis would 
likely find that the access provider in Netcom had knowledge of 
the subscriber's infringing posting because of the letter from 
the copyright holders.328 Based on such notification, that 
court would conclude that the access provider knew of the 
infringing activities yet continued to provide the subscriber 
access to the Internet via the bulletin board.329 
Because of factual differences in the cases, however, the 
Fonovisa analysis may not be dispositive. In Fonovisa, the 
swap meet operator received notification of the infringing sales 
from a law enforcement authority.33o The raid and seizure of 
counterfeit records were conducted under court orders.33l 
Moreover, the vendors did not raise a fair use defense.332 Giv-
en those circumstances, the court regarded the element of 
knowledge adequately alleged.333 In contrast, Netcom's 
knowledge that the posted material infringed the Church's 
copyright was based solely on the plaintiff's letter to 
325. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 264. 
326. Id. at 261. 
327. Id. 
328. Netcom. 907 F. Supp. at 1366. 
329. See supra notes 113-38 and accompanying text for discussion of 
knowledgeelement of contributory infringement. 
330. Fonovisa. 76 F.3d at 261. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. at 264. 
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Netcom.3M The plaintiff's request to remove the posting was 
not backed by a court order.335 Although the religious materi-
als displayed a copyright notice,336 a determination that the 
former minister fairly used the materials to illustrate his criti-
cism of the religion would excuse any infringing conduct.337 
Thus, without a judicial assessment of fair use, it is not clear 
that the access provider had adequate knowledge of the in-
fringement.33S 
b. Substantial participation 
Even with certain knowledge, a plaintiff must also show a 
third party's substantial participation in the infringing activi-
ty.339 The Fonovisa court held that the swap meet operator 
materially contributed to the infringing conduct by providing 
the vendors space, utilities, parking, advertising, and custom-
ers.340 Indeed, the court held that the sale of infringing re-
cordings could not have taken place in such massive quantities 
without the venue and support services provided by the swap 
meet operator.341 
Similarly, by applying the Fonovisa court's analysis to 
Netcom, a court would find that the access provider substan-
tially contributed to the infringing conduct of the subscrib-
er.M2 Under that analysis, merely providing the site and fa-
cilities for known infringing activity may establish contributory 
liability.343 To buttress its view, a court would point out that 
posting and downloading the copyrighted works across the 
computer network system could not take place without access 
334. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text for discussion of fair use de-
fense. 
338. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. 
339. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
340. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
341. Id. 
342. See supra notes 115-49 and accompanying text for discussion of substantial 
participation in contributory infringement. 
343. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
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to the Internet and its software support system.344 Thus, a 
court applying such analysis would hold that infringement of 
the Church's copyrighted works could not have taken place by 
such a large number of subscribers without access to the digi-
tal environment of the Internet and computer support services 
provided by Netcom. 
Yet, the context is distinguishable.345 In comparable 
terms to the swap meet, the Internet network is the site where 
transactions take place, and the access to the Internet is the 
road or gateway to that site.346 Therefore, Netcom did not 
provide the site for the infringing activity. Rather, Netcom 
provided one of the many access routes to the Internet.347 
Since the Fonovisa court did not contemplate the technology 
roles of players on the Internet, the· potential liability of an 
online access provider regarding the element of substantial 
participation remains uncertain.346 
c. Substantial noninfringing use 
Even if an access provider were deemed to materially 
contribute to infringing activity of others, the doctrine of "sub-
stantial noninfringing uses" articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Sony, may exempt an access provider from contributory 
liability.349 Applying this doctrine to an access provider, a 
court would not find liability if the access provider could show 
that its product was widely used for legitimate unobjectionable 
purposes.350 Thus, assuming that an access provider could 
show such noninfringing use, the access provider would not be 
held liable.351 Since the Fonovisa court did not explore this 
344. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831-32 (describing the nature of the Internet). 
345. See supra notes 177-86, 242-48 and accompanying text for comparison of 
factual settings in Netcom and Fonovisa. 
346. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for description of the Internet. 
347. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for description of the role of an 
access provider. 
348. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 372-73. 
349. Taitz, supra note 46, at 136; see supra notes 113-49 and accompanying 
text on contributory infringement liability. 
350. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
351. [d. 
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issue, and no other court has applied the doctrine to an online 
service provider, the contributory liability of an access provider 
remains unclear. 352 
In applying the Fonovisa court's analysis of contributory 
copyright infringement to Netcom, a court would likely find 
that plaintiffs proved both the elements of knowledge and 
substantial participation.353 Under such an analysis, the ac-
cess provider would be contributorily liable for the infringing 
conduct of a subscriber. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Copyright owners and Internet access providers view the 
problem of copyright infringement liability from diametric 
positions.3M Copyright owners urge greater liability through 
the traditional copyright principles of contributory and vicari-
ous infringement.355 Online access providers urge that liabili-
ty should attach only when or if the access provider has actual 
knowledge of the infringement, and has the capability of re-
moving the infringement, but fails to do so within a reasonable 
amount of time.356 Thus, the proposal combines the knowl-
edge standard of contributory liability and the control aspect of 
vicarious liability.357 
Legislation has not addressed the issue of a standard for 
access provider liability.358 The final report of the Clinton 
Administration's Working Group on Intellectual Property 
Rights, known as the White Paper, simply concluded that be-
cause the access providers are in a better position to police 
infringing users than the copyright owners, the best policy 
would be to hold the access provider liable.359 The White Pa-
per states that the threat of liability will motivate the access 
352. Id. 
353. See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text for Fonovisa court's analysis 
of contributory infringement. 
354. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 3. 
355. Id. 
356. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 74. 
357. Id .. 
358. Raysman & Brown, supra note 62, at 3. 
359. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 76. 
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provider to seek indemnification and licensing agreements, and 
spread the risk of liability through increased prices and insur-
ance.360 Perhaps SO.361 
Spreading the costs of copyright infringement, however, 
does not replace the need for unambiguous liability standards 
governing intellectual property rights on the Internet.362 Le-
gal standards of liability for copyright infringement lag behind 
advances in digital technology and growth of the Internet.363 
It is time once more for Congress to respond to technology 
changes.3M 
Mary Ann Shulman· 
360. Id. 
361. Taitz, supra note 46, at 160-61. 
362. Segal, supra note 2, at 138. 
363. Tickle, supra note 16; at 392 n.5. For example, strict liability under the 
Copyright Act for copying messages to transmit them to other host computers is 
not a workable theory. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73 (finding strict liability 
unreasonable for automatic copying of messages by access provider's computers). 
364. NIl White Paper, supra note 1, at 10. Thomas Jefferson stated: "I am not 
an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and institu-
tions must go hand and hand with the progress of the human mind. As that be-
comes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well re-
quire a man to wear still the .coat which fitted him when a boy .... " Id. at 7-8 
(quoting inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.). 
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